The District Court issued a summary judgment to Chevron in which it stated that the termination of the franchise was authorized by the PMPA. In the appeal proceedings, we find that a summary judgment is not appropriate, as there is a question of fact as to whether el-Khoury`s absence from paying a tax on state turnover was sufficiently essential to permit the franchise ratio. While downstream operations include the production and sale of petroleum products such as additives, fuels, petrochemicals and lubricants. This is the part in which the Chevron Gas Station franchise operates. If you are allowed to call Chevron Franchise, be sure to speak to at least five to eight franchisees. You will notice that most Chevron franchisees will be honest and impartial on Chevron. The District Court ruled that Chevron had terminated the deductible pursuant to two provisions of the PMPA: 15 U.S.C No. 2802 (b) (2) (A) and b) (2) (C). The Tribunal found that el-Khoury`s violation of dealer agreements was legally essential for the franchise ratio in point b) (2) (A). Although there is a question as to the significance of the offence, the Tribunal clarified that the importance of El-Khoury`s offence under the second provision, paragraph.b)) (2) (C), was not significant.
For these reasons, the Chevron Regional Court issued a summary judgment. El-Khoury appealed in time. In the second quarter of 1999, Riley El-Khoury was nominated for the exam. An independent law firm conducted the audit on April 22, 1999. The auditors found that the deductible had undervalued and underpaid the California revenue tax of about $15,000. In May 1999, Chevron issued a termination statement informing El-Khoury of its intention to terminate the franchise. Chevron explained that El-Khoury had violated the general provision of dealer agreements regarding compliance with the law by a distributor3. Our participation today is consistent with Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Guerami, 820 F.2d 280 (9. Cir.1987). We found that it was not necessary to determine whether an offence was serious enough to warrant termination in point b) (2) (C) if an event occurred below the point . 2802, point c). Id. at 283. In Guerami, the franchise was terminated because the franchisee had been “convicted [a] crime of moral turpitude”. 15 U.S.C No.
2802 (c) (12). In section 2802 (c) (12), the term “errors” is not used. In Guerami, there was no question that an “event” listed in section 2802, point c), occurred.